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Spatial connectivity of renewable resources induces a spatial externality in extraction. We explore
the consequences of decentralized spatial property rights in the presence of spatial externalities. We
generalize the notion of unitization - developed to enhance cooperative extraction of oil and gas fields
- and apply it to renewable resources which face a similar spatial commons problem. We find that
unitizing a common pool renewable resource can yield first-best outcomes even when participation
is voluntary, provided profit sharing rules can vary by participant.
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costello@bren.ucsb.eduThe collapse of many of the world's ¯sheries (Worm et al. 2006; Myers and Worm
2003; Jackson et al. 2001) has led to the search for policy approaches to prevent further
collapse and, perhaps, recover depleted stocks (Worm et al. 2009). The failure of traditional
regulation structures to halt this collapse has led economists to propose various property-
rights based approaches including Individual Tradeable Quotas (ITQs), which allocate units
of harvest, and Territorial User Rights Fisheries (TURFs), which allocate units of space to
private ¯rms, cooperatives, or ¯shermen.1 Economists argue that appropriate assignment of
rights internalizes externalities and facilitates stewardship, leading to sustainability through
a pro¯t motive.2 In the United States, there is growing policy interest in ocean zoning
and marine spatial planning, further motivating our inquiry. Yet for spatially connected
resources, the spatial commons problem may persist, even when spatial property rights
(TURFs) are assigned, monitored, enforced, and perpetual (Janmaat 2005). This occurs
because most harvested species of ¯sh exhibit large geographic scales of movement in some
part of their life cycle. While enlarging TURFs can help internalize spatial externalities,
White and Costello (2010) ¯nd that the spatial scale required to internalize dispersal may
be several hundreds or thousands of square kilometers.3 Ocean allocations of that size to
a single owner are unlikely, and as such, consideration of coordination (or the lack thereof)
between multiple owners of a spatially connected stock becomes paramount.
While compelling, the problem of spatial externalities in a common pool is not new. Mul-
tiple owners of mineral rights to an oil or gas ¯eld, where adjacent owners have an incentive
to over-invest in capital and extract at too rapid a rate, has similar (though not identical)
characteristics. A well-known solution in that context is unitization, where landowners are
contractually obligated to pool pro¯ts to minimize redundant drilling and extraction e®ort.4
3We generalize the concept of unitization as a possible solution to the spatial renewable re-
source problem. The idea is that by sharing pro¯ts, each owner has an interest in the pro¯ts
of other owners, and is thus less likely to over-harvest her own patch for personal gain if it
would harm her neighbor. The conditions under which this system works to solve the com-
mons problem is amenable to bioeconomic analysis, and is made possibly only by leveraging
recent advances in the theory of spatial bioeconomics.
We stress that this is not simply a theoretical exercise, as there are several examples
of such institutions that have arisen organically from historical communal use of spatially
connected renewable resources.5 For example, the sakuraebi (a small pink shrimp) ¯shery of
Japan is an example of a pro¯t-sharing system across TURFs that was introduced to alleviate
ine±ciencies associated with decentralized harvest by three separate TURFs within Suruga
Bay. While the introduction of the TURF system had promoted rationalization within
each of the three TURFs, stock dispersal and heterogeneity had led to stringent competition
between TURFs; this competition went so far as to include on and o®-shore violence (Uchida
and Wilen 2004). Ten years of this destructive behavior led the shrimp ¯shermen to form
the Sakuraebi Harvesters' Association (SHA) to coordinate harvest between the individual
TURFs. The SHA manages ¯shing activity on a daily basis, and as a result, only half the
°eet will be engaged in ¯shing on any given day. From the landed sales, a percentage fee
is collected by the SHA, with the remaining revenue net of ¯xed costs divided among boat
captains and crew members (Uchida and Baba 2008).
Another spatial ¯shery of note is the ¯shing cooperatives of Baja California, Mexico, a
collection of small community-based cooperative ¯sheries that primarily target spiny lob-
ster and abalone. Several of these ¯sheries in the Vizcaino Peninsula region have formed
4a federation (Fedecoop) to coordinate harvest across the spatial ¯sheries. Each of the 9
members of Fedecoop contribute a 30% pro¯t share to the federation, which in turn provides
bene¯ts for the individual cooperatives. While not a spatially de¯ned ¯shery, the Chignik
salmon ¯shery of Alaska featured a short-lived cooperative whereby roughly 20% of license
holders participated in ¯shing, while the remaining members were idle. Revenues where
then returned to cooperative members based on a pre-determined formula, such that ¯shing
members received $63,000 and non-¯shing members received $23,000 (Costello and Deacon
2007).6
While sharing institutions have emerged in ad hoc examples, no comprehensive theory
exists to help guide the design of these institutions across spatial property rights owners. For
example, can ¯rst-best e±cient harvest be achieved with unitization? How does the structure
of pro¯t sharing a®ect the achievement of ¯rst-best outcomes? How would design depend on
the biological or economic characteristics of the ¯shery? Is contractual obligation required?
Or can the unitization scheme be designed to incentivize participation? We address these
questions below.
This work incorporates a general framework of harvest decisions where a number of
owners make decentralized decisions regarding spatially explicit resource use. The general
renewable resource model we consider is both dynamic and spatial; resources grow and dis-
perse. Spatial connectivity among resource \patches" (e.g. ¯sh/larval movement) creates a
spatial externality.7 Unsurprisingly, in the absence of coordination, patch owners will tend to
overexploit the resident stock. Thus, any discussion of e±ciency will have to consider both
dynamic and spatial externalities, in addition to strategic behavior between patch owners.
The dynamic aspect of the model is in the spirit of existing dynamic optimization models
5(Clark 1990), while the spatial aspects build on existing models of \patchy" bioeconomics,
e.g. Brown and Roughgarden (1997) Sanchirico and Wilen (1999), Sanchirico and Wilen
(2001), Sanchirico and Wilen (2002) Sanchirico and Wilen (2005) and Costello and Polasky
(2008). A related literature considers the joint exploitation of a single resource stock by sev-
eral agents, building on seminal work in Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Munro (1979). This
\¯sh wars" literature identi¯ed a persistent externality of one country on another where the
resource stock moved across jurisdictions, a phenomenon that has recently been corrobated
empirically (McWhinnie 2009). While many of the insights of that literature also apply
here, we extend the bioeconomic model to allow for resource production and dispersal in
each jurisdiction (i.e. a \metapopulation") and explore the ability of unitization to correct
the ensuing externality across spatial property rights owners.
By exploiting the special structure of our dynamic and spatial game we are able to obtain
sharp analytical results of an otherwise intractable problem. Our benchmark case accords
with the results of Janmaat (2005) who ¯nds that for spatially connected renewable resources,
spatial property rights alone do not yield e±cient outcomes, except in trivial cases. We
then consider coordination between patch owners via a generalization of unitization. Under
unitization, each member contributes a share of her pro¯t to a general pool that is ultimately
redistributed across members in a particular way. The details of the levels of contribution
and redistribution a®ect both e±ciency and participation; this is the focus of much of our
analysis.
If properly designed, unitization acts to mitigate the commons problem. Thus the in-
dividual patch owner's decisions appear more like those of the sole owner. We ¯nd that
under contractually mandatory participation, unitization can yield ¯rst-best outcomes, but
6only when all pro¯ts are pooled. We show that allowing for endogenous participation in the
unitization scheme can still yield ¯rst-best outcomes, provided that shares can vary across
participants. We proceed by developing an analytical model of spatially-connected renewable
resources and deriving results regarding the ability of a well-engineered unitization scheme to
achieve e±ciency in resource use when participation is mandatory, and when it is voluntary.
1 A model of spatial property rights for renewable re-
sources
We require a spatially explicit dynamic bioeconomic model that is analytically tractable yet
allows for spatial heterogeneity in economics, biology, and the environment. We build upon
the dynamic model structure in Costello and Polasky (2008). Each of N resource patches,
indexed i = 1;2;:::;N, is exclusively managed by a single owner who chooses harvest in
her own patch in discrete time periods, t = 0;1;2;:::. Tenure is assumed to be guaranteed
and in¯nite.8 While our theory applies to any spatially connected renewable resource, it
facilitates exposition to focus on the ¯shery as an example.
1.1 Growth and spatial connectivity
Stock at the beginning of time t in patch i is given by xit. Harvest in each patch i is a decision
variable at each time t and is given by hit, and escapement eit is de¯ned as eit = xit ¡ hit.
Patches are spatially interconnected, e.g. by migrating ¯sh or larvae dispersing via ocean
currents. The timing is thus: the present period stock (xit) is observed and then harvested
7(hit) resulting in escapement (eit). This escapement produces young who disperse according





where fj(ejt) is a patch speci¯c growth function that re°ects idiosyncracies of patch ecology
(e.g. habitat quality) and Dji is the fraction of resident stock that disperses from patch j
to patch i each period, Dji ¸ 0,
PN
i Dji = 1, where Djj · 1 re°ects self-retention (Mitarai
et al. 2009).9 The initial stock in patch i is xi0. The function fi(e) is assumed to have the
standard properties for all i: f0
i(e) > 0, f00
i (e) < 0, and fi(0) = 0.
1.2 Economic returns
In addition to patch speci¯c heterogeneity in production and dispersal, we allow for di®er-
ential economic returns. The current period pro¯t from harvesting hit from patch i at time
t is given by the harvest model:10
¦it = (pi ¡ ci)hit (2)
= bi(xit ¡ eit); (3)
where pi and ci are patch-speci¯c prices and marginal harvest costs, we de¯ne as marginal
pro¯t bi ´ pi ¡ ci, and make use of the identity hit ´ xit ¡ eit. By assuming bi > 0
8i, we ensure that some harvest would always be (at least myopically) pro¯table in every
patch. Before considering the problem faced by decentralized patch owners under unitization,
8the next section derives two key results for comparison: the sole owner solution and the
uncoordinated, decentralized solution.
2 Benchmark results
2.1 The sole owner
Consider the benchmark case where a sole owner simultaneously manages all N intercon-
nected resource patches. Even for a sole owner, this poses a formidable challenge as it
generalizes the standard renewable resource harvesting problem to account for spatial in-
terconnections (via Dji) among an arbitrarily large collection of patches. By imposing a
modest amount of structure on this problem, we will be able to derive closed form analytical
results. We thus restrict attention to interior solutions where some harvest occurs in each
patch. While corner solutions (where some patches are optimally left unharvested or are
harvested to extinction) are a theoretical possibility (see Costello and Polasky (2008)), we
assume that conditions are such that some positive but non-extinguishing harvest is optimal:
xit > hit > 0 8i;t. We also adopt a benign assumption about dispersal:
Assumption 1. There is some out-of-patch dispersal: Dii < 1, 8i.
This assumption simply requires that patches are in fact spatially-connected, such that
some of the larvae from patch i will disperse to patch j. A violation of this assumption (so
Dii = 1) trivializes the problem by eliminating spatial connectivity, whereby the sole owner
solves a series of N unconnected standard renewable resource harvesting problems.
The sole owner's objective is to maximize the discounted net present value of pro¯t
9(Equation 2) across all patches and all time. Letting xt denote the vector [x1t:::xNt], the





bi(xit ¡ eit) + ±Vt+1(xt+1); (4)
which is subject to the biological constraints (Equation 1), and a discount factor ± · 1.









= 0 8i; (5)
where the ¯rst term captures the marginal cost of increasing escapement (and thus decreasing
harvest) in the current period, and the second captures the marginal bene¯t in future payo®s
to all patches from that increase in escapement. Because all patches are owned by the same
harvester, spillovers from dispersal from each patch are fully internalized.
This complicated dynamic optimization problem has a special structure, called \state in-
dependent control," for which the ¯rst-order conditions are independent of stock, xit (Costello
and Polasky 2008). This allows us to separate the problem temporally, and implies that es-
capement is location-speci¯c, but time-independent (Proposition 1 in Costello and Polasky
(2008)). This result accords with, but extends, existing resource models with perfectly elastic
demand for which a bang-bang solution is implemented to achieve an optimal escapement.
Because optimal escapement in patch i is constant, additional units of stock are simply
harvested, so the shadow value on stock is simply its net price:
@Vt+1(xt+1)




i(eit)Dij by rewriting Equation 1 in terms of xjt+1 and di®erenti-
10ating with respect to eit. Thus, what would otherwise be an extremely complicated spatial








it )Dij = 0 8i: (6)
The optimal level of escapement under a sole owner eSO
it will trade o® the present bene¯t of
harvest against the sum of future growth and dispersal to all patches, yielding a spatially











By the concavity of fi(ei), eSO
it is thus decreasing in own price (bi) and increasing in the
discount factor, ±. Note that Equation 7 collapses to the familiar golden rule of resource
economics in the absence of space: f0(e) = 1=±. While Equation 7 provides a useful bench-
mark, the remainder of this paper is devoted to the case of decentralized ownership of these
resource patches.
2.2 Uncoordinated Spatial Ownership
The other benchmark case we will require is uncoordinated, decentralized ownership of the
N patches. When coordination is absent, each of the N patch owners maximizes her patch-
speci¯c returns, taking as given the behavior of connected patch owners. The dynamic
programming equation for owner i is:
Vit(xt) = max
eit
bi(xit ¡ eit) + ±Vit+1(xt+1): (8)
11Owner i's choice must now account for the e®ect of all other patch owners' decisions on her



























Consider a Cournot-style model where each owner simultaneously chooses her own es-
capement taking all other escapements as given. Fixing ejt+1 implies
@Vit+1(xt+1)
@xjt+1 = 0 8j 6= i.
This follows because owner j simply harvests the additional stock down to ejt+1, leaving no
residual pro¯t for capture by owner i. This useful observation implies that the necessary







Because this remains a state independent control problem,
@Vit+1(xt+1)








i(eit)Dii = 0: (12)
Importantly, owner i's choice is independent of other owners' escapements. Rewriting the











12Because owner i's best response is independent of ejt (j 6= i), Equation 13 de¯nes a unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium vector of escapements for each owner under decentralized
ownership. This result leads to the following ¯rst proposition regarding the e±ciency of
spatial property rights in the absence of coordination.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, eUC
it < eSO
it .
Proof. By Equation 7 we have f0
i(eSO








i(e) > 0 and f00
i (e) < 0, eUC
it < eSO
it .
The magnitude of the di®erence between the sole owner and uncoordinated equilibria
will depend on the extent of the spatial externality, captured by the out-dispersal term in
the denominator ±
PN
j6=i(bj=bi)Dij. The larger is this term, the larger is the wedge between
the sole owner's escapement in that patch and that which is chosen by the uncoordinated
owner.12 To the extent that uncoordinated harvest is ine±ciently excessive (see Proposition
1), coordination will be required to align incentives across spatial rights holders. While it is
true that uncoordinated spatial property rights may fail to completely solve the commons
problem, it is likely that the owners themselves would also recognize this fact, and take
steps to coordinate. We address this topic below, beginning with a simple, yet powerful
coordinating mechanism.
3 Unitization
We have shown that even with well de¯ned and enforced spatial property rights, uncoor-
dinated owners will typically not achieve economically e±cient resource use (Proposition
131). Coordination may be induced by a Coasian bargaining solution or by other mechanisms
requiring side payments between users. Real world examples of spatial property rights in
renewable resources may involve hundreds of interconnected patches, and thus the number
of side payments would quickly become large (
N(N¡1)
2 ).13 We thus focus on unitization as a
simple budget balanced, fully internal mechanism with no required side payments.
3.1 Unitization
Consider a unitization scheme where each owner makes a contribution 0 · ®i · 1 of her
pro¯ts to a pool.14 Dividend 0 · °i · 1 of this aggregate pool is then redistributed to
patch i, such that
PN
i °i = 1.15 A particular unitization scheme is de¯ned by f®;°g, where
® = [®1;®2;:::;®N] and ° = [°1;°2;:::;°N]. For the ¯rst part of our analysis, we adopt the
following assumption regarding participation in unitization:
Assumption 2. All N owners are contractually obligated to participate in the unitization
scheme, f®;°g.
Under Assumption 2, patch owners are legally bound to participate in the unitization
scheme, as is typically the case for mineral rights owners in unitized oil and gas ¯elds. If
®i = 0 8i, no pro¯t sharing occurs, and thus the resource is not unitized and owners are
uncoordinated. If ®i = 1 8i, then all pro¯ts are shared (as is the case for unitized oil and
gas ¯elds); subsequent redistribution to each owner is governed by °. In the general case
(0 < ®i < 1) each individual owner chooses escapement conditional on ®i and °i, taking
other owners' decisions as given.16
14The dynamic programming equation for patch owner i is given by:
Vit(xt) = max
eit
(1 ¡ ®i)bi(xit ¡ eit) + ®i°i
N X
j=1
bj(xjt ¡ ejt) + ±Vit+1(xt+1) (14)
with necessary condition:








Because owner i takes all ejt (j 6= i) as given, from the perspective of owner i, owner
j immediately harvests any additional stock down to the given escapement level yielding
marginal value, bj. That value accrues to owner i based on the dividend, and we obtain:
@Vit+1(xt+1)
@xjt+1 = °ibj 8i;j. Combining this along with di®erentiation of Equation 1 gives owner
i's best response function:












which remains independent of any other owner's escapement decision. The left hand terms
represents the current period marginal cost of increasing escapement: (1¡®i) forgone private
harvest value, and ®i°i share of the foregone harvest value. The right term represents the
marginal bene¯t: discounted private (1 ¡ ®i) and pooled (®i°i) share of future value of
marginal growth and dispersal of the resource.
Thus, we can immediately write the resulting optimal escapement rule e
f®;°g
it as a function






(1 ¡ ®i)bi + ®i°ibi




Equation 17 de¯nes a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium vector of escapements for
each owner under unitization scheme f®;°g.17 How does the pro¯le of escapements under
15unitization compare to the pro¯le under a sole owner of the spatially connected renewable
resource? It turns out that the escapement under unitization is ine±ciently low (i.e. harvest
is excessive) in all patches, as is formalized below:

















bi(1¡®i)biDii > 1, or simply that
PN
j=1 bjDij
biDii > 1, which trivially




While Proposition 2 shows that unitization leads to ine±cient harvest levels, it seems
intuitive that sharing a larger fraction of pro¯ts would enhance e±ciency because larger
contributions lead owners to take more account of the spatial externality. This intuition is
formalized below:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-2, an increase in contribution 0 < ®i < 1 leads to an
increase in the e±ciency of the ¯shery.
Proof. Proposition 2 implies f0
i(e
f®;°g
i ) > f0
i(eSO
i ). Next, we show that
dei
d®i > 0. By the












the concavity of fi(¢),
dei
d®i > 0. We next show that total ¯shery pro¯ts are increasing in
escapement ei when ei < eSO
i and regardless of ej. The total ¯shery present value (assum-
ing the steady-state is reached after the initial period) for a given vector of escapements









bi(xi ¡ ei) (18)












i(ei)Dij ¡ bi) (19)
which is independent of ej;8j 6= i. The present value of the ¯shery is maximized when
Equation 19 is equal to zero, which yields escapement identical to the sole owner escapement
eSO




i ), and thus d¼
dei > 0. Finally, the change in










The intuition underlying Proposition 3 is that an increase in the contribution increases
the dependence of owner i's pro¯ts on the performance of spatially connected owners. Thus,
owner i will place more weight on how her escapement a®ects the pro¯ts of her neighbors.
We have shown that escapement under \partial" unitization (when ®i < 1 8i) is inef-
¯ciently low and that increasing the contribution ®i increases the e±ciency of the ¯shery.
This raises the question: How e±cient is full unitization (®i = 1 8i)? Let eF
i be the escape-
ment chosen by each owner under full unitization. The following proposition shows that this
escapement level will be equivalent to the ¯rst-best.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-2, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium escapement
















The result follows by inspection of Equations 20 and 7.
This intuitive yet powerful result seems to solve our e±ciency problem: simply constrain-
ing all users to fully share pro¯ts yields economic e±ciency. Under full unitization, each
owner chooses the escapement in her patch that maximizes the joint return of all patches,
which is precisely the decision that a sole owner would make. This derivation yields an
additional useful result:
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1 - 2 and full unitization ®i = 1, the e±ciency of uniti-
zation is independent of the dividend °i 8i.
Proof. This result follows from the fact that Equation 20 is independent of °i.
Provided that all patch owners are mandated to participate in the scheme, each patch
owner's escapement choice is identical to the ¯rst-best choice, regardless of the dividend.
However, while the intensive margin decision of escapement is independent of the dividend,
the extensive margin decision to participate will clearly depend on this dividend. In the
following section, we consider the e®ects of unitization when participation is voluntary.
184 Unitization with Endogenous Participation
In oil and gas unitization in the United States, participation is typically mandatory. Mineral
rights holders in unitized oil and gas ¯elds are required to share pro¯ts in a fully unitized
manner (®i = 1 8i). We have shown that a similar legal obligation might solve the spatial
externality problem present for spatially connected renewable resource owners. But we ask
whether contractual obligation is necessary for e±ciency. Here we endogenize participation
decisions in order to determine if unitization need be mandatory in order to produce a
¯rst-best e±cient outcome.
4.1 Repeated play by patch owners
To explore the individual rationality of participation in the unitization scheme f®;°g, we
couch our bioeconomic model as an in¯nitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with N


























i represents the shared pro¯t of cooperation when all players choose the fully e±cient
escapement levels eF
i . ¦N
i represents i's pro¯t from defecting and choosing eUC
i while the other
owners play eF
j6=i. Finally, ¦D
i represents i's pro¯t when all owners choose their uncoordinated
escapement, eUC
i , i.e. when everyone defects.
There are many potential strategies to consider, and we adopt a Nash reversion strategy
to punish defectors. Under this punishment strategy, any defector is punished forever by all
19other owners reverting to eUC
i . Here, if owner i defects during period t, she will enjoy the fruits
of her defection in that ¯rst period, and will be `punished' by every other owner defecting
in the subsequent periods. Thus, we can calculate the dynamic bene¯ts of cooperation and


























Defection amounts to choosing the uncoordinated escapement of eUC
i , which leads to a
steady-state defection stock of xUC


























The ¯rst term represents the ¯rst period bene¯t of defection (choosing the uncoordinated
level of escapement while every other owner is still playing cooperatively), while the second
represents the discounted stream of bene¯ts from the steady-state uncoordinated equilibrium.
Given the history of play, each owner will consider her pro¯t taking as given the escapement
of other owners. In essence, owners will consider the short-term bene¯ts of defection versus
the long-term di®erence in pro¯ts between sharing a cooperative equilibrium and going it
alone. If we ¯nd conditions under which JC
i ¸ JD
i for all owners i, then unitization is e±cient
and supportable as a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. Whether this occurs will depend
20on the design of the unitization scheme. Because e±ciency requires ®i = 1 8i (Proposition
4), we focus on the importance of the set of dividends ° = [°1;°2;:::;°N].
4.2 Patch-speci¯c dividends
We leverage the fact that our unitization scheme allows the dividends °i to vary across
patch owners. The key question here is: Does a set of dividends exist that 1) encourages
full participation and 2) is feasible? In considering this question, the result in Corollary 1
becomes crucial. Because harvest e±ciency by each patch owner is independent of °i, we
can consider the minimum °i, denoted ^ °i, such that patch owner i would prefer cooperation
(equation 24) to defection (equation 25). As long as
PN
i ^ °i · 1, the share structure is
feasible and yields ¯rst-best e±ciency for the ¯shery.

































To explore the determinants of ^ °i, we will adopt the following approach. Consider a
spatially connected renewable resource with N patch owners, and focus on two such owners,
labeled i and j. What characteristics of these patch owners lead to high, or low, values of ^ °i
and ^ °j? To answer this question, we isolate e®ects by holding in common all characteristics
between patches i and j, save one. We de¯ne the following conditions:
21Condition 1. Patches i and j have \equi-in°ow" if Dki = Dkj for all k.
Condition 2. Patches i and j have \equi-price" if bi = bj.
Condition 3. Patches i and j have \equi-production" if fi(e) = fj(e).
Condition 4. Patches i and j have \equi-retention" if Dii = Djj.
We are interested in comparing ^ °i to ^ °j. We begin by noting that the denominator
for ^ °i from Equation 27 is the same as the denominator for ^ °j. Whether ^ °i 7 ^ °j requires














We derive and will subsequently make use of the following lemmas:
Lemma 1. Under Conditions 3 and 4, eUC
i = eUC
j .
Proof. This follows from inspection of Equation 13, and invoking Conditions 3 and 4.





Proof. Equation 1 implies that xi = f1(e1)D1i + f2(e2)D2i + ::: + fN(eN)DNi and xj =
f1(e1)D1j + f2(e2)D2j + ::: + fN(eN)DNj. For any set of escapements e1;e2;:::;eN, these are
equal by Condition 1.
These facts give rise to the following propositions regarding the characteristics of patches
that determine the dividend required to induce voluntary participation.
Proposition 5. Suppose that Conditions 1, 3, and 4 hold, and bi > bj, then ^ °i > ^ °j.
22Proof. Under the assumed Conditions, Lemmas 1 and 2 hold, so the only di®erence in the
numerator is bi and bj. The result ^ °i > °j follows trivially.
Proposition 6. Suppose that Conditions 1, 2 and 3 hold, and Dii > Djj, then ^ °i < ^ °j.
Proof. By Lemma 2 and Condition 2, comparing the numerator requires only comparing
¡eUC
i 7 ¡eUC
j . From Equation 13, and invoking Condition 3 and the assumption about
retention, eUC
j < eUC
i , and therefore, ^ °i < ^ °j.
Proposition 7. Suppose that Conditions 1, 2, and 4 hold, and f0
i(¹ e) > f0
j(¹ e) 8¹ e, then ^ °i < ^ °j.
Proof. By Lemma 2 and Condition 2, only need to compare ¡eUC
i 7 ¡eUC
j . From Equation
13, and invoking Condition 4 and the assumption about growth, eUC
j < eUC
i , and therefore,
^ °i < ^ °j.
The intuition underlying Proposition 5 is straightforward: patches with a higher price or
lower marginal cost of harvest (higher bi) require a larger dividend °i of total ¯shery pro¯ts
to discourage defection. Proposition 6 hinges on the fact that patches with less self-retention
(smaller Dii) will harvest to a lower level of escapement when defecting, making initial de-
fection more pro¯table relative to patches with higher self-retention. Proposition 7 reveals
a counterintuitive result on the minimum dividend required to entice patch owners into
the unitization scheme. In contrast to Proposition 5 which found that more economically
productive patches require larger dividends, Proposition 7 shows that more biologically pro-
ductive patches (higher f0
i(¹ e) 8¹ e) require smaller dividends to encourage participation. This
result follows from the fact that patches with higher productivity will choose higher levels
of escapement when defecting, decreasing the bene¯t of initial defection and thus requiring
a smaller dividend to entice cooperation.
23In order for the dividend structure described by Equation 27 to be feasible, the individual
dividends must sum to less than unity:
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This leads to our next proposition regarding the e±ciency of unitization under voluntary
participation:
Proposition 8. Under Assumption 1, there exists a discount factor ~ ± < 1 such that for any
± ¸ ~ ±, full unitization with endogenous participation is supportable, and ¯rst-best, economi-
cally e±cient harvest can be achieved.
Proof. The denominator of Equation 29 is simply the ¯rst-best value of the ¯shery in steady
state. If ± = 1, the numerator is equal to the value of the ¯shery in the absence of unitization,
and as this is less than the ¯rst-best value of the ¯shery, the ratio in Equation 29 is strictly
less than one. On the other hand, if ± = 0, the numerator is strictly greater than the
denominator, as eUC
i < eF
i and the ratio is strictly greater than one. Thus, by the intermediate
value theorem, there exists some 0 < ~ ± < 1 such that the ratio in Equation 29 is equal to
one. For ± ¸ ~ ±, the dividend given by Equation 27 is feasible and full participation with full
unitization is supportable, yielding ¯rst-best outcomes per proposition 4.
This ¯nalizes our main result: by generalizing the concept of unitization, we have shown
that fully e±cient exploitation can be voluntarily achieved by completely self-interested patch
owners and that this result does not require in¯nite patience.
244.2.1 Alternative strategy considerations
Our result relies on Nash reversion as a means to punish defectors. It may be worth consid-
ering punishment strategies other than Nash reversion. One shortcoming of Nash reversion
is that it is not renegotiation proof (Van Damme 1989) and punishers may have an incentive
to `let bygones be bygones' and allow a defector back into the cooperative and resume pro¯t
sharing. An extension that considers the potential of renegotiation proof strategies (such
as Bhat and Hu®aker (2007) and Cave (1987)) or more sophisticated punishment strategies
(as in Tarui et al. (2008)) in unitized spatially connected renewable resources may prove
insightful.
4.2.2 Practical considerations
In the above analysis, the dividend was allowed to vary across patches. However, as a prac-
tical matter, such varying shares may be di±cult for owners to agree upon. Fish harvested
in patch i may come from larvae produced by stock in patch j, which may make agreement
on unit shares di±cult to come by. Wiggins and Libecap (1985) and Libecap and Wiggins
(1985) detail contracting issues in oil unitization, emphasizing the di±culties of unit share
agreement as a result of imperfect information. The biological systems underlying renewable
resources may make the process of agreeing on unit shares even more contentious.18
5 Conclusions
Spatial connectivity of renewable resources induces a spatial externality in extraction. For
this reason, spatial property rights alone are insu±cient to solve the commons problem. We
25generalize the notion of unitization, developed to coordinate extraction of common oil and gas
¯elds, to spatially connected renewable resources. This coordination mechanism is framed
within a spatial bioeconomic model with a patchy \metapopulation." Patch owners then
compete in a dynamic game because owner i's harvest a®ects all other owners in subsequent
periods. Our main result is that unitization can serve to coordinate spatial property rights
owners. If designed properly, ¯rst-best harvest can be achieved, even in cases when the
resource would be completely destroyed in the absence of unitization. The unitization scheme
relies on two instruments: an owner-speci¯c contribution (the fraction of pro¯ts an owner
must yield to the common pool) and an owner-speci¯c dividend (the fraction of the pool
redistributed to the owner). By allowing the unitization scheme to vary by participant (e.g.,
as a function of patch-speci¯c biological productivity or economic returns), the mechanism
can induce voluntary participation by all spatial property rights owners.
The special structure of our di®erence game allows us to obtain sharp analytical results,
but the analysis is not without caveats. There is an implicit assumption throughout the
paper that the sole owner would achieve socially e±cient harvest. While common in the
bioeconomics literature, this is somewhat of a heroic assumption, but it does reduce the
complexity of our problem. Incorporating other features such as ecological bene¯ts or vary-
ing discount rates into the spatial bioeconomic model presented here may prove interesting.19
Considering harvest incentives under a more general economic model may also be fruitful,
as would considering the case of spatial reserves under spatial property rights. For example,
might a patch owner ¯nd it optimal to pay another patch owner to completely shutdown
harvest in her patch (Costello and Ka±ne 2010)? While we have focused on spatial prop-
erty rights over renewable resources, this unitization scheme might apply more generally.
26For example, if property rights are assigned on the basis of allowable ¯sh catch (individual
transferable quotas (ITQs)), owners may bene¯t from coordination on harvest via a uni-
tization mechanism. Owners of ITQ in the crab ¯shery in New Zealand coordinate via a
mechanism similar to this where owners contribute quota share to a cooperative (\Crabco")
and pro¯ts are redistributed di®erentially to participants at the end of the season (Soboil
and Craig 2008).
While the unitization scheme presented here yields ¯rst-best outcomes under manda-
tory participation and can yield ¯rst-best outcomes under voluntary participation, practical
considerations may constrain implementation, and unitization structures with less than full
participation and less than full unitization may maximize the value of spatial renewable
resource extraction.
27Notes
1For example, the 2007 reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act allows for various tradeable property schemes. A recent study (Costello,
Gaines, and Lynham 2008) suggests that ITQs have been successful in slowing ¯shery col-
lapse.
2See Hannesson (2004) for an excellent discussion of attempts to privatize the ocean with
ITQ's and spatial rights. Examples of formalized spatial property right systems include
TURFs in Chile, community cooperatives in Japan and Mexico, and the 200 mile Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs) established by the Law of the Sea; a famous informal example occurs
in the Maine lobster ¯shery where harbor `gangs' exercise de facto spatial rights (Acheson
1988).
3For example, for spiny lobster, substantial losses (relative to optimal management) were
still found even with TURF alongshore widths of 100km, principally due to larval transport
by ocean currents and not because of adult movement. This stands in sharp contrast to the
size of existing TURFs in Chile and Japan (discussed extensively in Cancino, Uchida, and
Wilen (2007)) which may extend less than 1 km alongshore.
4The problem of unitization and contracting between users of a nonrenewable common
pool resource has been studied in depth for the oil industry in a series of papers by Libecap
and Wiggins (Libecap and Wiggins (1984),Wiggins and Libecap (1985), Libecap and Wiggins
(1985)). They examine the contracting success, and frequently the failure, of private ¯rms
drilling the same common oil ¯eld. They generally ¯nd that heterogeneity plays a key role
in thwarting the success of contracts to lessen rent dissipation and overproduction.
285We focus here on examples of pro¯t sharing across spatial units of ownership, as opposed
to pro¯t sharing within spatially de¯ned units of ownership. Within a spatially-de¯ned unit
of ownership (i.e. a TURF), pro¯t-sharing can be used to induce cooperation between
multiple harvesters. For example, pro¯ts are pooled among cooperative members within the
walleye pollack ¯shery of the Nishi region of Japan and redistributed to TURF members
(Uchida and Watanobe 2008). The loco ¯sheries in Chile's TURF system also use partial
revenue pooling mechanisms within a TURF to mitigate race-to-¯sh incentives (Uchida and
Wilen 2005). Within the deep sea crab ¯shery of New Zealand, quota owners have \invested"
their quota shares within Crabco, the sole company involved in the crab ¯shing operation.
Pro¯ts are returned to investors based on the share invested in the company (Mincher 2008).
6The cooperative was disbanded by a court ruling that held that the cooperative was
illegal on the grounds that it was illegal for a ¯sherman to pro¯t from a right to ¯sh without
undertaking any actual ¯shing activity.
7This feature is present at some life-history stage for many commercially viable species.
8See Costello and Ka±ne (2008) for a discussion of how uncertain tenure a®ects harvest
incentives for renewable resources.
9The parameter Dji captures larval dispersal across space and will be species-speci¯c.
10We leave the exploration of decentralized spatial bioeconomic models with stock e®ects
to future work.
11State independence of the control variable also implies that the open loop and feedback
control rules are identical. This result was established, and coined state separability for
continuous time models by Dockner, Geichtinger, and Jorgensen (1985).
12We make a few notes about Proposition 1 when Assumption 1 does not hold. If f0
i(0) ·
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±Dii, the optimal escapement is eUC
it = 0 by the non-negativity constraint on eit. On the other
hand, if Dij = 0 for i 6= j, the optimal escapement is equivalent to the economically e±cient
sole owner's. Without dispersal, each owner controls a self-contained ¯efdom and property
rights can be assigned con¯dently without concern for coordination or cooperation; e±cient
harvest will occur for owners solely interested in their own pro¯ts. However, as noted in the
introduction, larval dispersal in ¯sheries is typically larger than practical spatial property
right assignments to individual users.
13A small example is in Baja California where the 9 spatial property rights owners in the
cooperative \Fedecoop" would require 36 separate annual side payments. A large example is
in Chile where 453 permanent TURFs exist for harvesting an abalone-like snail, which could
require > 100;000 side payments.
14Consistent with our assumption that pro¯ts (rather than, e.g., revenues) are shared,
Libecap and Smith (1999) argue that production and cost shares must coincide to induce
e±ciency in unitization contracts for oil and gas extraction.
15In practice, the redistribution may not be entirely pecuniary. For example, in Chile
and Japan pro¯t sharing partly pays for science, monitoring, and enforcement. For oil and
gas, coordination is undertaken by a \unit operator" a concept that has been adopted (in
principle, not in name) in some ¯sheries, e.g. the Chignik Salmon Cooperative (Deacon,
Parker, and Costello 2008).
16Heintzelman, Salant, and Schott (2009) consider a similar pro¯t sharing solution for
homogenous agents harvesting a common property resource and ¯nd that coordinating can
improve economic outcomes.
17Note that equilibrium pro¯le of escapements under the three cases we consider (sole
30owner, uncoordinated owners, and unitization) are all independent of the state, and are thus
constant over time. We henceforth suppress time subscripts for ease of exposition.
18Libecap and Wiggins (1984) argue that the di±culties of agreeing on a complete uniti-
zation contract led many oil ¯elds to adopt prorationing, which created some margins for
rent dissipation, but was easier to reach agreement on.
19Clark and Munro (1980) consider the case of varying discount factor when the sole owner
deviates from the social discount factor. They ¯nd that corrective taxes may be necessary
to ensure economically e±cient behavior.
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